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When one company spots an attacker and reports it well, another company can block the same attacker before it gets in. That simple idea is behind a quiet but useful change from the US government's cyber agency.
Today is November 15, 2026. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has upgraded the form organisations use to report cyber incidents. It now asks for more detail and uses the vocabulary of MITRE ATT&CK, a widely used catalogue of attacker behaviour. At the same time, a separate set of mandatory reporting rules for critical infrastructure is moving through review. It is easy to mix the two up, so this post separates them and shows how a team can get ready.
What CISA changed
The updated form is on CISA's Incident Reporting Portal. According to CISA:
- It asks for more detailed information about each incident.
- It uses terms from the MITRE ATT&CK framework to describe what the attacker did.
- It has expanded questions for incidents involving malware, social engineering, hacking techniques and insider threats.
- The changes reflect feedback from the security community.
CISA's goal is to spot campaigns, meaning groups of attacks run by the same people, that would otherwise look like unrelated incidents at different organisations. Chris Butera, CISA's acting executive assistant director for cybersecurity, put it this way: "one organization's detection is another's protection."
CISA encourages any organisation hit by an incident to report voluntarily. It names federal civilian agencies as the ones required to report under its arrangements. That statement is about CISA's own reporting system only; it is not a full list of every legal duty your organisation may have elsewhere.
Why MITRE ATT&CK matters here
MITRE describes ATT&CK as a knowledge base of attacker tactics (the goal at each stage, such as getting in or staying hidden) and techniques (the specific method used), built from real-world observations. It gives defenders a shared language for how attackers get access, run commands, keep a foothold, move between systems and reach their goal.
A shared language makes reports comparable. Imagine two companies that both report "an account was compromised". At one, a phishing email led to a stolen password. At the other, an exposed remote-access service let the attacker in, and the attacker then moved across several servers. The label is the same, but the story is completely different. Recording the actual sequence of steps tells analysts far more than the label.
There is a limit, though. Many attackers use the same common techniques. Two incidents that share a technique are not automatically the same campaign. Investigators still need other evidence before linking incidents or naming a group.
The gap this tries to close
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), the US government's audit body, has documented the underlying problem. In its work on ransomware, it found that information about attacks on critical infrastructure could be incomplete, hard to compare or not specific enough to each sector. It also pointed to the limits of voluntary reporting: victims may be reluctant to come forward, and reports are scattered across agencies and industry groups, so there was no single full count of ransomware incidents.
A better form improves the quality of the reports CISA receives. It cannot fix the reports that never arrive. So the real value depends on how many organisations take part, not just on how good the questions are.
How this builds on earlier portal changes
This is not the first upgrade. In August 2024, CISA moved its reporting form to the CISA Services Portal, with Login.gov sign-in and the ability to save and update reports. That version also allowed sharing reports with colleagues or clients for third-party reporting, searching and filtering past reports, and informal discussion with CISA through a collaboration feature.
The ability to update a report matters. Investigations change. What you believe on day one often shifts as forensic work shows the real scope.
Do not confuse this with CIRCIA
The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) is a separate effort. It directs CISA to create mandatory reporting rules for covered critical infrastructure organisations. CISA's guidance says those incident and ransom-payment reporting duties do not apply until the final rule takes effect, and it keeps encouraging voluntary sharing until then.
Law firm Covington reported on October 8 that CISA sent a draft final rule to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs on October 1 for interagency review. The firm described the law as requiring covered entities to report qualifying incidents within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24 hours.
Sending a draft rule for review is a step in the process, not the start date. The new form does not switch those deadlines on. Federal records also show that commenters asked CISA to reduce the rule's scope and burden, align it with other federal reporting rules and clarify its terms. A better form helps with collecting information, but it does not settle those overlaps.
How Rohit gets the team ready
Rohit leads security at Acme, a mid-sized logistics company. Acme is not a federal agency, but it may choose to report voluntarily and may fall under CIRCIA once the final rule lands. Here is the preparation plan Rohit writes, in line with NIST Special Publication 800-61 Revision 3 (published April 2025), which places incident response inside wider risk management and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0.
Step 1: Decide who can report
Name the people who can approve a submission to CISA, and a backup for each. Agree who keeps the official investigation record and who sends updates when new facts appear.
Step 2: Check your legal duties separately
Ask legal or compliance to list which reporting rules actually apply to Acme, by sector and country. Keep that list apart from the technical reporting plan, because the two answer different questions.
Step 3: Describe attacks in ATT&CK terms
Train analysts to record observed behaviour using ATT&CK tactics and techniques during investigations, not after. That way the report is mostly ready when it is needed, and it lines up with the form's vocabulary.
Step 4: Practise building a timeline fast
Run a tabletop exercise, a practice session where the team walks through a pretend incident. Test whether the team can quickly put together a reliable timeline, list affected systems and describe the business disruption.
Step 5: Keep facts and guesses apart
Mark every statement as confirmed or suspected. Suspected data theft is not the same as confirmed exfiltration, and the first door you find is not always the root cause. Good reports keep the uncertainty visible.
Step 6: Plan for updates
Expect to update the report as forensics progress. Note what changed and why, so CISA and anyone you share with see the latest picture.
These are sound response practices. They are not a verified list of the fields on the updated form.
Conclusion
CISA's upgraded form asks better questions and speaks the same ATT&CK language defenders already use, which should make it easier to link separate attacks into campaigns. It is not the CIRCIA mandate, and it does not start any deadlines. The useful move now is to make reporting part of incident preparation: know who reports, describe attacks clearly, separate facts from guesses, and keep the record current.
Merits
- Richer, structured reports help analysts spot related attacks across organisations.
- ATT&CK terms let different teams and tools describe attacks the same way.
- Expanded questions cover malware, social engineering, hacking and insider threats.
- Reports can be saved, updated and shared as investigations develop.
- Preparing to report well also improves your own incident response.
Demerits
- Reporting remains voluntary for most organisations, so many incidents may go unreported.
- More detailed forms can take more time during a stressful incident.
- Shared techniques can tempt people to link incidents without enough evidence.
- The form does not resolve overlaps between different federal reporting rules.
- CIRCIA timing is still uncertain while the final rule is under review.
Caution
This article is educational. The company Acme and the example person Rohit are placeholders and must be replaced with your own situation. The facts here summarise announcements and analyses available at the time of writing, and rules such as CIRCIA may change before they take effect. Do not treat this as legal advice; confirm your reporting duties with qualified counsel and check official CISA guidance before relying on these points.
Frequently asked questions
- What did CISA change in its incident reporting form? — It now asks for more detailed information, uses MITRE ATT&CK terms and has expanded questions on malware, social engineering, hacking and insider threats.
- What is MITRE ATT&CK? — It is a knowledge base of attacker tactics and techniques based on real-world observations, used as a common language by defenders.
- Is reporting to CISA mandatory? — CISA encourages voluntary reporting and names federal civilian agencies as required to report under its arrangements; other duties depend on your sector and location.
- Does the new form start CIRCIA deadlines? — No, CIRCIA duties apply only once the final rule takes effect, and the draft was only sent for review on October 1.
- What are the CIRCIA reporting deadlines? — As described in published analysis, covered entities would report qualifying incidents within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24 hours.
- Can I update a report after submitting it? — Yes, the CISA Services Portal has supported saving and updating reports since August 2024.
- Does sharing an ATT&CK technique mean two attacks are linked? — No, many attackers use common techniques, so linking incidents needs more evidence.
- How should a company prepare to report incidents? — Name who can report, check legal duties separately, record attacks in ATT&CK terms, practise timelines and keep facts apart from guesses.
Tags
#cisa #incidentresponse #mitreattack #cybersecurity #circia #threatintelligence #incidentreporting #securityoperations #nist #cyberresilience
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